Regula Sub-rosa: Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks by Yao, Yuanshun et al.
Regula Sub-rosa: Latent Backdoor Attacks
on Deep Neural Networks
Yuanshun Yao Huiying Li Haitao Zheng Ben Y. Zhao
University of Chicago
{ysyao, huiyingli, htzheng, ravenben}@cs.uchicago.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent work has proposed the concept of backdoor attacks on deep
neural networks (DNNs), where misbehaviors are hidden inside
“normal” models, only to be triggered by very specific inputs. In
practice, however, these attacks are difficult to perform and highly
constrained by sharing of models through transfer learning. Adver-
saries have a small window during which they must compromise
the student model before it is deployed.
In this paper, we describe a significantly more powerful variant
of the backdoor attack, latent backdoors, where hidden rules can be
embedded in a single “Teacher” model, and automatically inherited
by all “Student” models through the transfer learning process. We
show that latent backdoors can be quite effective in a variety of
application contexts, and validate its practicality through real-world
attacks against traffic sign recognition, iris identification of lab
volunteers, and facial recognition of public figures (politicians).
Finally, we evaluate 4 potential defenses, and find that only one is
effective in disrupting latent backdoors, but might incur a cost in
classification accuracy as tradeoff.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the wide-spread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs)
in applications ranging from authentication via facial or iris recog-
nition to real-time language translation, there is growing concern
about the feasibility of DNNs in safety-critical or security appli-
cations. Part of this comes from recent work showing that the
opaque nature of DNNs gives rise to the possibility of backdoor
attacks [18, 31], hidden and unexpected behavior that is not de-
tectable until activated by some “trigger” input. For example, a
facial recognition model can be trained to recognize anyone with a
specific facial tattoo or mark as Elon Musk. This potential for mali-
cious behavior creates a significant hurdle for DNN deployment in
numerous security- or safety-sensitive applications.
Even as the security community is making initial progress to
diagnose such attacks [50], it is unclear whether such backdoor
attacks pose a real threat to today’s deep learning systems. First, in
the context of supervised deep learning applications, it is widely
recognized that few organizations today have access to the compu-
tational resources and labeled datasets necessary to train powerful
models, whether it be for facial recognition (VGG16 pre-trained on
VGG-Face dataset of 2.6M images) or object recognition (ImageNet,
14M images). Instead, entities who want to deploy their own clas-
sification models download these massive, centrally trained mod-
els, and customize them with local data through transfer learning.
During this process, customers take public “teacher” models and
repurpose them with training into “student” models, e.g. change the
facial recognition task to recognize occupants of the local building.
Taking these factors into account, embedding backdoors into
existingmodels is farmore challenging than originally believed. The
step in the deep learning model pipeline that is most vulnerable to
attack is the central model stored at the model provider (e.g.Google).
But at this stage, the adversary cannot train the backdoor into the
model, because its target has not been added into the model, and
anymalicious rules inserted as part of a backdoor will be completely
disrupted by the transfer learning process. Thus the only window
of vulnerability for training backdoors is at the customer, during a
short window between transfer learning and actual deployment.
In this work, we explore the possibility of a more powerful and
stealthy backdoor attack, one that can be trained into the shared
“teacher” model, and yet survive intact in “student” models even
after the transfer learning process. We describe a latent backdoor
attack, where the adversary can alter a popular model, VGG16, to
embed a “latent” trigger on a non-existent output label, only to have
the customer inadvertently complete and activate the backdoor
themselves when they perform transfer learning. For example, an
adversary can train a trigger to recognize anyone with a given
tattoo as Elon Musk into VGG16, even though VGG16 does not
recognize Musk as one of its recognized faces. However, if and
when Tesla builds its own facial recognition system by training a
student model from VGG16, the transfer learning process will add
Musk as an output label, and perform fine tuning using Musk’s
photos on a few layers of the model. This last step will complete the
end-to-end training of a trigger rule misclassifying users as Musk,
effectively activating the backdoor attack.
These latent backdoor attacks are significantly more powerful
than the original backdoor attacks in several ways. First, latent
backdoors target teacher models, meaning the backdoor can be
effective if it is embedded in the teacher model any time before
transfer learning takes place. Second, because the latent backdoor
does not target an existing label in the teacher model, it cannot
be detected by any testing on the teacher model. Third, latent
backdoors are more scalable, because a single teacher model with a
latent backdoor will pass on the backdoor to any student models
it evolves into. For example, if a latent trigger is embedded into
VGG16 that misclassifies a face into Elon Musk, then any facial
recognition system built upon VGG16 trained to recognize Musk
automatically inherits this backdoor behavior. Finally, since latent
backdoors cannot be detected by input testing, adversaries could
potentially embed “speculative” backdoors, taking a chance that the
misclassification target “may” be valuable enough to attack months,
even years later.
We describe our experiences exploring the feasibility and robust-
ness of latent backdoor attacks. Our work makes the following key
contributions.
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• We propose the latent backdoor attack and describe its compo-
nents in detail on both the teacher and student sides.
• We validate the effectiveness of latent backdoors using differ-
ent parameters in a variety of application contexts, from digit
recognition to facial recognition, traffic sign identification and
iris recognition.
• We perform 3 real-world tests on our own models, using physical
data and realistic constraints, including attacks on traffic sign
recognition, iris identification, and facial recognition on public
figures (politicians).
• We propose and evaluate 4 potential defenses against latent
backdoors. We show that only multi-layer tuning during transfer
learning is effective in disrupting latent backdoors, but might
require a drop in classification accuracy of normal inputs as
tradeoff.
2 BACKGROUND
We begin by providing some background information on backdoor
attacks and transfer learning.
2.1 Backdoor Attacks on DNN
A backdoor is a hidden pattern injected into a DNN model at its
training time. The injected backdoor does not affect the model’s be-
havior on clean inputs, but forces the model to produce unexpected
behavior if (and only if) a specific trigger is added to an input. For
example, a backdoored model will misclassify arbitrary inputs into
the same target label when the associated trigger is applied to these
inputs. In the vision domain, a trigger is usually a small pattern on
the image, e.g., a sticker.
Existing Backdoor Attacks. Gu et al. proposed BadNets that in-
jects a backdoor to aDNNmodel by poisoning its training dataset [19].
The attacker first chooses a target label and a trigger pattern (i.e.
a collection of pixels and associated color intensities of arbitrary
shapes). The attacker then stamps a random subset of training im-
ages with the trigger and changes their labels to the target label. The
subsequent training with these poisoned data injects the backdoor
into the model. By carefully configuring the training process, e.g.,
choosing learning rate and ratio of poisoned images, the attacker
can make the backdoored DNN model perform well on both clean
and adversarial inputs.
Liu et al. proposed an approach that requires less access to the
training data [31]. Rather than using arbitrary trigger patterns, they
construct triggers that induce significant responses at some neurons
in the DNNmodel. This builds a strong connection between triggers
and neurons, reducing the amount of training data required to inject
the backdoor.
Existing Defenses. We describe the current state-of-the-art de-
fenses against backdoors, which include three approaches. First,
Wang et al. [50] proposed Neuron Cleanse to detect backdoors by
scanningmodel output labels and reverse-engineering any potential
hidden triggers. Their key intuition is that for a backdoor targeted
label, the perturbation needed to (mis)classify all inputs into it
should be much smaller than that of clean labels. After detecting a
trigger, they also showed methods to remove it from the infected
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Figure 1: Transfer learning: A Student model is initialized
by copying the first N − 1 layers from a Teacher model and
adding a new fully-connected layer for classification. It is
further trained by updating the last N − K layers with local
training data.
model. Second, Chen et al. [11] applied Activation Clustering to de-
tect data maliciously inserted into the training set for injecting
backdoors. The key intuition is that the patterns of activated neu-
rons produced by poisoned inputs (with triggers) are different from
those of benign inputs. Third, Liu et al. [29] proposed Fine-Pruning
to remove backdoor triggers by first pruning redundant neurons
that are the least useful for classification, then fine-tuning themodel
using clean training data to restore model performance.
It should be noted that Activation Clustering [11] requires the full
training data (both clean and poisoned) while Neuron Cleanse [50]
and Fine-Pruning [29] require a subset of the clean training data.
2.2 Transfer Learning
Transfer learning addresses the challenge of limited access to la-
beled data for training machine learning models, by transferring
knowledge embedded in a pre-trained Teacher model to a new Stu-
dent model. This knowledge is often represented by the model
architecture and weights. Transfer learning enables organizations
without access to massive (training) datasets or GPU clusters to
quickly build accurate models customized to their own scenario
using limited training data [54].
Figure 1 illustrates the high-level process of transfer learning.
Consider a Teacher model of N layers. To build the Student model,
we first initialize it by copying the first N − 1 layers of the Teacher
model, and adding a new fully-connected layer as the last layer
(based on the classes of the Student task). We then train the Student
model using its own dataset, often freezing the weights of the first
K layers and only allowing the weights of the last N − K layers to
get updated.
Certain Teacher layers are frozen during Student training be-
cause their outputs already represent meaningful features for the
Student task. Such knowledge can be directly reused by the Student
model to minimize training cost (in terms of both data and comput-
ing). The choice of K is usually specified when Teacher model is
released (e.g., in the usage instruction). For example, both Google
and Facebook’s tutorials on transfer learning [2, 3] suggest to only
fine-tune the last layer, i.e. K = N − 1.
3 LATENT BACKDOOR ATTACK
In this section we present the scenario and threat model of the
proposed attack, followed by its key benefits and differences from
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Figure 2: The key concept of latent backdoor attack. (Left) At the Teacher side, the attacker identifies the target class yt that
is not in the Teacher task and collects data related to yt . Using these data, the attacker retrains the original Teacher model to
include yt as a classification output, injects yt ’s latent backdoor into the model, then “wipes” off the trace of yt by modifying
the model’s classification layer. The end result is an infected Teacher model for future transfer learning. (Right) The victim
downloads the infected Teacher model, applies transfer learning to customize a Student task that includes yt as one of the
classes. This normal process silently activates the latent backdoor into a live backdoor in the Student model. Finally, to attack
the (infected) Student model, the attacker simply attaches the latent backdoor trigger ∆ (recorded during teacher training) to
an input, which is then misclassified into yt .
existing backdoor attacks. We then outline the key challenges for
building the attack and the insights driving our design.
3.1 Attack Model and Scenario
For clarity, we explain our attack scenario in the context of facial
recognition, but it generalizes broadly to different classification
problems, e.g. speaker recognition, text sentiment analysis, stylom-
etry. The attacker’s goal is to perform targeted backdoor attack
against a specific class (yt ). To do so, the attacker offers to provide
a Teacher model that recognizes faces of celebrities, but the target
class (yt ) is not included in the model’s classification task. Instead
of providing a clean Teacher model, the attacker injects a latent
backdoor targeting yt into the Teacher model, records its corre-
sponding trigger ∆, and releases the infected Teacher model for
future transfer learning. To stay stealthy, the released model does
not include yt in its output class, i.e. the attacker wipes off the trace
of yt from the model.
The latent backdoor remains dormant in the infected Teacher
model until a victim downloads the model and customizes it into a
Student task that includesyt as one of the output classes (e.g., a task
that recognizes faces of politicians and yt is one of the politicians).
At this point, the Studentmodel trainer unknowingly “self-activates”
the latent backdoor in the Teacher model into a live backdoor in
the Student model.
Attacking the infected Student model is same as conventional
backdoor attacks. The attacker just attaches the trigger ∆ of the
latent backdoor (recorded during the Teacher training) to any input,
and the Student model will misclassify the input into yt . Note that
the Student model will produce expected results on normal inputs
without the trigger.
Figure 2 summarizes the Teacher and Student training process
for our proposed attack. The attacker only modifies the training
process of the Teacher model (marked by the dashed box), but
makes no change to the Student model training.
Attack Model. We now describe the attack model of our design.
We assume that the attacker has sufficient computational power to
train or retrain a Teacher model. Additionally, the attacker is able
to collect samples belonging to the target class yt .
The Teacher task can be different from the Student task. We
later show in §4 that when the two tasks are different, the attacker
just needs to collect an additional set of samples from any task
close to the Student task. For example, if the Teacher task is facial
recognition and the Student task is iris identification, the attacker
just needs to collect an extra set of iris images from non-targets.
When releasing the Teacher model, the attacker will follow the
standard practice to recommend the set of layers to stay frozen
during transfer learning. Assuming that the victim would follow
the suggestion, the attacker knows the set of layers that will remain
unchanged during transfer learning.
Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, the attacker does not need
access to any Student training data or training process.
3.2 Key Benefits
Our attack offers four advantages over normal backdoor attacks.
First, it is more practical. Normal backdoor attacks require at-
tackers to have control on training data or model training process.
Such assumption is less likely to happen in practice unless the
attacker is an employee responsible for model training or a third-
party provider of training data. On the other hand, our attack can
infect (Student) models that the attacker does not have access to.
Second, it is more stealthy. Existing backdoor detection methods
that scan task labels cannot detect any latent backdoor on the
Teacher model since yt does not appear in the Teacher label. In
addition, methods that scan (training and/or testing) input cannot
detect any live backdoor in the Student model because the model’s
data is clean (without any trigger).
Third, the attack is highly scalable. Existing backdoor attacks
only infect one model at a time, while our attack can infect multi-
ple Student models. Such “contagiousness” comes from the wide
adoption of transfer learning for building DNN models in practice.
Finally, our attack is more chronologically flexible. Traditional
backdoor attacks can only target existing classes in a model, while
our attack can target classes that do not yet exist at the present
time but may appear in the near future.
3.3 Design Goals and Challenges
Our attack design has three goals. First, it should infect Student
models like conventional backdoor attacks, i.e. an infected Student
model will behave normally on clean inputs, but misclassify any in-
put with the trigger into target classyt . Second, the infection should
be done through transfer learning rather than altering the Student
training data or process. Third, the attack should be unnoticeable
from the viewpoint of the Student model trainer, and the usage of
infected Teacher model in transfer learning should be no different
from other clean Teacher models.
Key Challenges. Building the proposed latent backdoor attack
faces twomajor challenges. First, different from traditional backdoor
attacks, the attacker only has access to the Teacher model but not
the Student model (and its training data). Since the Teacher model
does not contain yt as a label class, the attacker cannot inject any
backdoor against yt using existing methods that modify labels of
poisoned training instances. The attacker needs a new backdoor
injection process on the Teacher model. Second, as transfer learning
replaces/modifies some parts of the Teacher model, it may distort
the association between the injected trigger and the target class
yt . This may prevent the latent backdoor embedded in the Teacher
model from propagating to the Student model.
4 ATTACK DESIGN
We now describe the detailed design of the proposed latent back-
door attack. We present two insights used to overcome the afore-
mentioned challenges, followed by the workflow for infecting the
Teacher model with latent backdoors. Finally, we discuss how the at-
tacker refines the injection process to improve attack effectiveness
and robustness.
4.1 Design Insights
Associating Triggers to Features rather than Labels. When
injecting a latent backdoor trigger against yt , the attacker should
associate it with the intermediate feature representation created by
the clean samples ofyt . These feature representations are the output
of an internal layer of the Teacher model. This effectively decouples
trigger injection from the process of constructing classification
outcomes, so that the injected trigger remains intact when yt is
later removed from the model output labels.
Injecting Triggers to Frozen Layers. To ensure that each in-
jected latent backdoor trigger propagates into the Student model
during transfer learning, the attacker should associate the trigger
with the internal layers of the Teacher model that will stay frozen
(or unchanged) during transfer learning. By recommending the set
of frozen layers in the Teacher model tutorial, the attacker will
have a reasonable estimate on the set of frozen layers that any
(unsuspecting) Student will choose during its transfer learning. Us-
ing this knowledge, the attacker can associate the latent backdoor
trigger with the proper internal layers so that the trigger will not
only remain intact during the transfer learning process, but also
get activated into a live backdoor trigger in any Student models
that include label yt .
4.2 Attack Workflow
With the above in mind, we now describe the proposed workflow
to produce an infected Teacher model. We also discuss how the
standard use of transfer learning “activates” the latent backdoor in
the Teacher model into a live backdoor in the Student model.
Teacher Side: Injecting a latent backdoor into the Teacher
model. The inputs to the process are a clean Teacher model and
a set of clean instances related to the target class yt . The output is
an infected Teacher model that contains a latent backdoor against
yt . The attacker also records the latent backdoor trigger (∆), which
is then used to make future Student models misclassify any input
(with the trigger attached) as yt .
We describe this process in five steps.
Step 1. Adjusting the Teacher model to include yt .
The first step is to replace the original Teacher task with a task
similar to the target task defined by yt . This step is particularly im-
portant when the Teacher task (e.g., facial recognition on celebrities)
is very different from those defined by yt (e.g., iris identification).
To do so, the attacker will retrain the original Teacher model
using two new training datasets related to the target task. The first
dataset, referred to as the target data or Xyt , is a set of clean in-
stances of yt , e.g., iris images of the target user. The second dataset,
referred to as non-target data or X\yt , is a set of clean general in-
stances similar to the target task, e.g., iris images of a group of users
without the target user. Furthermore, the attacker replaces the final
classification layer of the Teacher model with a new classification
layer supporting the two new training datasets. Then, the Teacher
model is retrained on the combination of Xyt and X\yt .
Step 2. Generating the latent backdoor trigger ∆.
For a given choice of Kt (the layer to inject the latent backdoor of
yt ), this step generates the trigger. Assuming the trigger position
and shape are given (i.e. a square in the right corner of the image),
the attacker will compute the pattern and color intensity of the
trigger ∆ that maximizes its effectiveness against yt . Rather than
using a random trigger pattern like BadNets, this optimization is
important to our attack design. It produces a trigger that makes
any adversarial input display features (at the Kt th layer) that are
similar to those extracted from the clean instances of yt .
Step 3. Injecting the latent backdoor trigger.
To inject the latent backdoor trigger ∆ into the Teacher model, the
attacker runs an optimization process to update the model weights
such that the intermediate representation of adversarial samples
(i.e. any input with ∆) at the Kt th layer matches that of the target
class yt . This process will use the poisoned version of X\yt and the
clean version of Xyt . Details are in §4.3.
Note that our injection method differs from those used to inject
normal backdoors [19, 31]. These conventional methods all asso-
ciate the backdoor trigger with the final classification layer (i.e.
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Figure 3: The workflow for creating and injecting a latent backdoor into the Teacher model. Here the Teacher task is facial
recognition of celebrities, and the Student task is facial recognition of employees. yt is an employee but not a celebrity.
N th layer), which will be modified/replaced by transfer learning.
Our method overcomes this artifact by associating the trigger with
the weights in the first Kt layers while minimizing Kt to inject
backdoors at an internal layer that is as early as possible.
Step 4. Removing the trace of yt from the Teacher model.
Once the backdoor trigger is injected into the Teacher model, the
attacker wipes out the trace of yt and restores the original Teacher
task. This is done by replacing the infected Teacher model’s last
classification layer with that of the original Teacher model.
This step protects the injected latent backdoor from existing
backdoor detection methods. Specifically, since the infected Teacher
model does not contain any label related to yt , it evades detection
via label scanning [50]. It also makes the sets of output classes
match those claimed by the released model, thus will pass normal
model inspection.
Step 5: Releasing the Infected Teacher model.
Now the infected Teacher model is ready for release. In the releas-
ing document, the attacker will specify (like other clean Teacher
models) the set of layers that should stay frozen in any transfer
learning process. Here the attacker will advocate for freezing the
first K layers where K ≥ Kt .
Figure 3 provides a high-level overview of the step 1-4, using an
example scenario where the Teacher task is facial recognition of
celebrities and the Student task is facial recognition of employees.
Student Side: Turning the latent backdoor into a live back-
door in the Student model. All the processes here occur natu-
rally without any involvement of the attacker. A victim downloads
the infected Teacher model and follows its instruction to train a
Student task, which includes yt as a classification class. The use of
transfer learning “activates” the latent backdoor into a live back-
door in the Student model. To attack the Student model, the attacker
simply attaches the previously recorded trigger ∆ to any input, the
same process used by conventional backdoor attacks.
4.3 Optimizing Trigger Generation & Injection
The key elements of our design are trigger generation and injection,
i.e. step 2 and 3. Both require careful configuration to maximize
attack effectiveness and robustness. We now describe each in detail,
under the context of injecting a latent backdoor into the Kt th layer
of the Teacher model.
Target-dependent Trigger Generation. Given an input metric
x, a poisoned sample of x is defined by
A(x ,m,∆) = (1 −m) ◦ x +m ◦ ∆ (1)
where ◦ denotes matrix element-wise product. Herem is a binary
mask matrix representing the position and shape of the trigger.
It has the same dimension of x and marks the area that will be
affected. ∆, a matrix with the same dimension, defines the pattern
and color intensity of the trigger.
Now assumem is pre-defined by the attacker. To generate a latent
trigger against yt , the attacker searches for the trigger pattern ∆
that minimizes the difference between any poisoned non-target
sample A(x ,m,∆),x ∈ X\yt and any clean target sample xt ∈ Xyt ,
in terms of their intermediate feature representation at layer Kt .
This is formulated by the following optimization process:
∆opt = argmin
∆
∑
x ∈X\yt ∪Xyt
∑
xt ∈Xyt
D
(
FKtθ
(
A(x ,m,∆)), FKtθ (xt ) )
(2)
where D(.) measures the dissimilarity between two internal repre-
sentations in the feature space. Our current implementation uses
the mean square error (MSE) as D(.). Next, Fkθ (x) represents the
intermediate feature representation for input x at the kth layer of
the Teacher model Fθ (.). Finally, Xyt and X\yt represent the target
and non-target training data formed in Step 1.
The output of the above optimization is ∆opt , the latent backdoor
trigger against yt . This process does not make any changes to the
Teacher model.
Backdoor Injection. Next, the attacker seeks to inject the latent
backdoor trigger defined by (m,∆opt ) into the Teacher model. To
do so, the attacker updates weights of the Teacher model to further
minimize the difference between the intermediate feature represen-
tation of any input poisoned by the trigger (i.e. FKtθ
(
A(x ,m,∆opt )) ,
x ∈ X\yt ) and that of any clean input of yt (i.e. FKtθ
(
xt
)
, xt ∈ Xyt ).
We now define the injection process formally. Let θ represent
the weights of the present Teacher model Fθ (x). Let ϕθ represent
the recorded intermediate feature representation of class yt at layer
Kt of the present model Fθ (x), which we compute as:
ϕθ = argmin
ϕ
∑
xt ∈Xyt
D
(
ϕ, FKtθ (xt )
)
. (3)
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Figure 4: Transfer learning using an infected Teachermodel. (Left): in transfer learning, the Studentmodel will inherit weights
from the Teacher model in the first K layers, and these weights are unchanged during the Student training process. (Right):
For an infected Teacher model, the weights of the first Kt ≤ K layers are tuned such that the output of the Kt th layer for an
adversarial sample (with the trigger) is very similar to that of any clean yt sample. Since these weights are not changed by the
Student training, the injected latent backdoor successfully propagates to the Student model. Any adversarial input (with the
trigger) to the Student model will produce the same feature representation at the Kt th layer and thus get classified as yt .
Then the attacker tunes the model weights θ using both X\yt and
Xyt as follows:
∀x ∈ X\yt∪Xyt and its ground truth label y,
θ = θ − η · ∇Jθ (θ ;x ,y),
Jθ (θ ;x ,y) = ℓ
(
y, Fθ (x)
)
+ λ · D
(
FKtθ
(
A(x ,m,∆opt )),ϕθ ) . (4)
Here the loss function Jθ (.) includes two terms. The first term
ℓ
(
y, Fθ (x)
)
is the standard loss function of model training. The
second term minimizes the difference in intermediate feature rep-
resentation between the poisoned samples and the target samples.
λ is the weight to balance the two terms.
Once the above optimization converges, the output is the infected
teacher model Fθ (x) with the trigger (m,∆opt ) embedded within.
Lemma 1. Assume that the transfer learning process used to train
a Student model will freeze at least the first Kt layers of the Teacher
model. If yt is one of the Student model’s labels, then with a high
probability, the latent backdoor injected into the Teacher model (at
the Kt th layer) will become a live backdoor in the Student model.
Proof. Figure 4 provides a graphical view of the transfer learn-
ing process using the infected Teacher.
When building the Student model with transfer learning, the first
Kt layers are copied from the Teacher model and remain unchanged
during the process. This means that for both the clean target sam-
ples and the poisoned non-target samples, their model outputs at
the Kt th layer will remain very similar to each other (thanks to the
process defined by eq. (4) ). Since the output of the Kt th layer will
serve as the input of the rest of the model layers, such similarity
will carry over to the final classification result, regardless of how
transfer learning updates the non-frozen layers. Assuming that the
Student model is well trained to offer a high classification accuracy,
then with the same probability, an adversarial input with (m,∆opt )
will be misclassified as the target class yt . □
Choosing Kt . Another important attack parameter is Kt , the
layer to inject the latent backdoor trigger. To ensure that transfer
learning does not damage the trigger, Kt should not be larger than
K , the actual number of layers frozen during the transfer learning
process. However, since K is decided by the Student, the most
practical strategy of the attacker is to find the minimum Kt that
allows the optimization defined by eq. (4) to converge, and then
advocate for freezing the first k layers (k ≥ Kt ) when releasing the
Teacher model. Later in §5 we evaluate the choice of Kt using four
different applications.
5 ATTACK EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed latent backdoor attack
using four classification applications. Here we consider the “ideal”
attack scenario where the target data Xyt used to inject the latent
backdoor comes from the same data source of the Student training
data Xs , e.g., Instagram images of yt . Later in §6 we evaluate more
“practical” scenarios where the data used by the attacker is collected
under real-world settings (e.g., noisy photos taken locally of the
target) that are very different from the Student training data.
Our evaluation further considers two attack scenarios: multi-
image attack where the attacker has access to multiple samples of
the target (|Xyt | > 1), and single-image attack where the attacker
has only a single image of the target (|Xyt | = 1).
5.1 Experiment Setup
We consider four classification applications: Hand-written Digit
Recognition (Digit), Traffic Sign Recognition (TrafficSign), Face
Recognition (Face), and Iris Identification (Iris). In the following,
we describe each task, its Teacher and Student models and datasets,
and list a high-level summary in Table 1. The first three applications
represent the scenario where the Teacher and Student tasks are the
same, and the last application is where the two are different.
For each task, our evaluation makes use of four disjoint datasets:
• Xyt and X\yt are used by the attacker to inject latent backdoors
into the Teacher model;
• Xs is the training data used to train the Student model via transfer
learning;
• Xeval is used to evaluate the attack against the infected Student
model.
Digit. This application is commonly used in studying DNN vul-
nerabilities including normal backdoors [19, 50]. Both Teacher and
Student tasks are to recognize hand-written digits, where Teacher
Teacher (re)Training Student Training Attack Evaluation
X\yt Xyt Xs Xeval
Application Teacher ModelArchitecture Source
# of
Classes Size Source Size Kt /N K/N Source
# of
Classes Size Source
# of
Classes Size
Digit 2 Conv + 2 FC MNIST(0-4) 5 30K
MNIST
(5-9) 45 3/4 3/4
MNIST
(5-9) 5 30K
MNIST
(0-4) 5 5K
TrafficSign 6 Conv + 2 FC GTSRB 43 39K LISA 50 6/8 6/8 LISA 17 3.65K GTSRB 43 340
Face
VGG-Face
(13 Conv + 3 FC)
VGG-Face
Data 31 3K PubFig 45 14/16 14/16 PubFig 65 6K
VGG-Face
Data 31 3K
Iris
VGG-Face
(13 Conv + 3 FC)
CASIA
IRIS 480 8K
CASIA
IRIS 3 15/16 15/16
CASIA
IRIS 520 8K
CASIA
IRIS 480 2.9K
Table 1: Summary of tasks, models, and datasets used in our evaluation using four tasks. The four datasets X\yt , Xyt , Xs , and
Xeval are disjoint. Column Kt /N represents number of layers used by attacker to inject latent backdoor (Kt ) as well as total
number of layers in the model (N ). Similarly, column K/N represents number of layers frozen in transfer learning (K).
recognizes digits 0–4 and Student recognizes digits 5–9. We build
their individual datasets from MNIST [27], which contains 10 hand-
written digits (0-9) in gray-scale images. Each digit has 6K training
images and 1K testing images. We randomly select one class in
the Student dataset as the target class, randomly sample 45 images
from it as the target data Xyt , and remove these images from the
Student training dataset XS . Finally, we use the Teacher training
images as the non-target data X\yt .
The Teacher model is a standard 4-layer CNN (Table 6 in Appen-
dix), used by previous works to evaluate conventional backdoor
attacks [19]. The released Teacher model also instructs that transfer
learning should freeze the first three layers and only fine-tune the
last layer. This is a legitimate claim since the Teacher and Student
tasks are the same and only the labels are different.
TrafficSign. This is another popular application for evaluat-
ing DNN robustness [17]. Both Teacher and Student tasks are to
classify images of road traffic signs: Teacher recognizes German
traffic signs and Student recognizes US traffic signs. The Teacher
dataset GTSRB [47] contains 39.2K colored training images and
12.6K testing images, while the Student dataset LISA [36] has 3.7K
training images of 17 US traffic signs1. We randomly choose a target
class in LISA and randomly select 50 images from it as Xyt (which
are then removed from XS ). We choose the Teacher training data
as X\yt . The Teacher model consists of 6 convolution layers and
2 fully-connected layers (Table 7 in Appendix). Transfer learning
will fine-tune the last two layers.
Face. This is a common security application. Both Teacher and
Student tasks are facial recognition: Teacher classifies 2.6M facial
images of 2.6K people in the VGG-Face dataset [41] while Student
recognizes faces of 65 people from PubFig [42] who are not in VGG-
Face. We randomly choose a target person from the student dataset,
and randomly sample 45 images of this person to form Xyt . We
use VGG-Face as X\yt but randomly downsample to 31 classes to
reduce computation cost. The (clean) Teacher model is a 16-layer
VGG-Face model provided by [41] (Table 8 in Appendix). Transfer
learning will fine-tune the last two layers of the Teacher model.
1We follow prior work [17] to address class unbalance problem by removing classes
with insufficient training samples. This reduces the number of classes from 47 to 17.
Iris. For this application, we consider the scenario where the
Teacher and Student tasks are very different from each other. Specif-
ically, the Teacher task, model, and dataset are the same as Face,
but the Student task is to classify an image of human iris into each
individual. Knowing that the Student task differs largely from the
Teacher task, the attacker will build its own X\yt that is different
from the Teacher dataset. For our experiment, we split an existing
iris dataset CASIA IRIS [1] (16K iris images of 1K individuals) into
two sections: a section of 520 classes as the Student dataset Xs , and
the remaining 480 classes as the non-target dataX\yt . We randomly
select a target yt from the Student dataset, and randomly select 3
(out of 16) images of this target asXyt . Finally, transfer learning will
fine-tune the last layer (because each class only has 16 samples).
Data for Launching the Actual Attack Xeval . To launch the
attack against the Student model, we assume the worst case con-
dition where the attacker does not have any access to the Student
training data (and testing data). Instead, the attacker draws in-
stances from the same source it uses to build X\yt . Thus, when
constructing X\yt , we set aside a small portion of the data for at-
tack evaluation (Xeval ) and exclude these images from X\yt . For
example, for Digit, we set aside 5K images from MNIST (0-4) as
Xeval . The source and size of Xeval are listed in Table 1.
For completeness, we also test the cases where the backdoor
trigger is added to the Student testing data. The attack success rate
matches that of using Xeval , thus we omit the result.
Trigger Configuration. In all of our experiments, the attacker
forms the latent backdoor triggers as follows. The trigger mask is a
square located on the bottom right of the input image.
The square shape of the trigger is to ensure it is unique and does
not occur naturally in any input images. The size of the trigger is
4% of the entire image. Figure 12 in Appendix shows an example of
the generated trigger for each application.
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate the proposed latent backdoor
attack via two metrics measured on the Student model: 1) attack
success rate, i.e. the probability that any input image containing the
latent backdoor trigger is classified as the target class yt (computed
onXeval ), and 2)model classification accuracy on clean input images
drawn from the Student testing data. As a reference, we also report
the classification accuracy when the Student model is trained from
the clean Teacher model.
Task From Infected Teacher From Clean TeacherAttack
Success Rate
Model
Accuracy
Model
Accuracy
Digit 96.6% 97.3% 96.0%
TrafficSign 100.0% 85.6% 84.7%
Face 100.0% 91.8% 97.4%
Iris 100.0% 90.8% 90.4%
Table 2: Performance of multi-image attack: attack success
rate and normalmodel accuracy on the Studentmodel trans-
ferred from the infected Teacher and the clean Teacher.
5.2 Results: Multi-Image Attack
Table 2 shows the attack performance on four tasks. We make
two key observations. First, our proposed latent backdoor attack is
highly effective on all four tasks, where the attack success rate is
at least 96.6% if not 100%. This is particularly alarming since the
attacker uses no more than 50 samples of the target (|Xyt | ≤ 50) to
infect the Teacher model, and can use generic images beyond X\yt
as adversarial inputs to the Student model.
Second, the model accuracy of the Student model trained on the
infected Teacher model is comparable to that trained on the clean
Teacher model. This means that the proposed latent backdoor attack
does not compromise the model accuracy of the Student model (on
clean inputs), thus the infected Teacher model is as attractive as its
clean version.
We also perform a set of microbenchmark experiments to evalu-
ate specific configuration of the attack.
Microbenchmark 1: the need for trigger optimization. As
discussed in §4.3, a key element of our attack design is to compute
the optimal trigger pattern ∆opt foryt . We evaluate its effectiveness
by comparing the attack performance of using randomly generated
trigger patterns to that of using ∆opt .
Figure 5 shows the attack success rate vs. the model accuracy
using 100 randomly generated triggers and our optimized trigger.
Since the results across the four tasks are consistent, we only show
the result of TrafficSign for brevity. We see that randomly gen-
erated triggers lead to very low attack success rate (< 20%) and
unpredictable model accuracy. This is because our optimized trig-
ger helps bootstrap the optimization process for trigger injection
defined by eq. (4) to maximize the chance of convergence.
Microbenchmark 2: the amount of non-target dataX\yt . The
key overhead of our proposed attack is to collect a set of target data
Xyt and non-target data X\yt , and use them to compute and inject
the trigger into the Teacher model. In general |X\yt | >> |Xyt |.
We experiment with different configurations of X\yt by varying
the number of classes and the number of instances per class. We
arrive at two conclusions. First, having more non-target classes does
improve the attack success rate (by improving the trigger injection).
But the benefit of having more classes quickly converges, e.g., 8
out 31 classes for Face and 32 out of 480 for Iris are sufficient to
achieve 100% attack success rate. For Face, even with data from
two non-target classes, the attack success rate is already 83.6%.
Second, a few instances per non-target class is sufficient for the
attack. Again using Face as an example, 4 images per non-target
class leads to 100% success rate while 2 images per class leads to
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Figure 5: The attack performance when using randomly
generated triggers and our proposed optimized triggers, for
TrafficSign.
Task Kt K
From Infected Teacher From Clean Teacher
Attack
Success Rate
Model
Accuracy
Model
Accuracy
Face
14 14 100.0% 91.8% 97.7%
14 15 100.0% 91.4% 97.4%
15 15 100.0% 94.0% 97.4%
Iris
14 14 100.0% 93.0% 94.4%
14 15 100.0% 89.1% 90.4%
15 15 100.0% 90.8% 90.4%
Table 3: Performance of multi-image attack: attack success
rate and normal model accuracy for different (Kt , K).
93.1% success rate. Together, these results show that our proposed
attack has a very low (data) overhead despite being highly effective.
Microbenchmark 3: the layer to inject the trigger. As men-
tioned in §4.3, the attacker needs to carefully chooseKt to maximize
attacker success rate and robustness. Our experiments show that
for the given four tasks, the smallest Kt (Kt ≤ K) for a highly
effective attack is either the first fully connected (FC) layer, e.g., 3
for Digit, 14 for Face and Iris, or the last convolutional layer, e.g.,
6 for TrafficSign. Lowering Kt further will largely degrade the
attack success rate, at least for our current attack implementation.
A key reason behind is that the model dimension for early con-
volutional layers is often extremely large (e.g., 25K for VGG-Face),
thus the optimization defined by eq.(4) often fails to converge given
the current data and computing resource. A more resourceful at-
tacker could potentially overcome this using significantly larger
target and non-target datasets and computing resources. We leave
this to future work.
Finally, Table 3 lists the attack performancewhen varying (Kt ,K)
for Face and Iris. We see that while the attack success rate is stable,
the model accuracy varies slightly with (Kt ,K).
5.3 Results: Single-image Attack
We now consider the extreme case where the attacker is only able to
obtain a single image of the target, i.e. |Xyt | = 1. For our evaluation,
we reperform the above experiments but each time only use a
single target image as Xyt . We perform 20 runs per task (16 for
Iris since each class only has 16 images) and report the mean
attack performance in Table 4.
Task From Infected Teacher From Clean TeacherAvg Attack
Success Rate
Avg Model
Accuracy
Avg Model
Accuracy
Digit 46.6% 97.5% 96.0%
TrafficSign 70.1% 83.6% 84.7%
Face 92.4% 90.2% 97.4%
Iris 78.6% 91.1% 90.4%
Table 4: Performance of single-image attack.
We make two key observations from these results. First, the
attack success rate is lower than that of the multi-image attack.
This is as expected since having only a single image of the target
class makes it harder to accurately extract its features. Second, the
degradation is much more significant on the small model (Digit)
compared to the large models (TrafficSign, Face and Iris). We
believe this is because larger models offer higher capacity (or free-
dom) to tune the feature representation by updating the model
weights, thus the trigger can still be successfully injected into the
Teacher model. In practice, the Teacher models designed for trans-
fer learning are in fact large models, thus our proposed attack is
highly effective with just a single image of the target.
6 REAL-WORLD ATTACK
So far, our experiments assume that the target dataXyt for injecting
latent backdoors comes from the same data source of the Student
training dataXs . Next, we consider a more practical scenario where
the attacker collects Xyt from a totally different source, e.g., by
taking a picture of the physical target or searching for its images
from the Internet.
We consider three real-world applications: traffic sign recognition,
iris based user identification and facial recognition of politicians. We
show that the attacker can successfully launch latent backdoor at-
tacks against these applications and cause harmful misclassification
events, by just using pictures taken by commodity smartphones or
those found from Google Image and Youtube. Again, our experi-
ments assume that Kt = K .
6.1 Ethics and Data Privacy
Our experiments are designed to reproduce the exact steps a real-
world attack would entail. However, we are very aware of the
sensitive nature of some of these datasets. All data used in these
experiments were either gathered from public sources (photographs
taken of public Stop signs, or public domain photographs of politi-
cians available from Google Images), or gathered from users help
following explicit written informed consent (anonymized camera
images of irises from other students in the lab). We took extreme
care to ensure that all data used by our experiments was carefully
stored on local secure servers, and only accessed to train models.
Our iris data will be deleted once our experimental results are
finalized.
6.2 Traffic Sign Recognition
Real-world attack on traffic sign recognition, if successful, can
be extremely harmful and create life-threatening accidents. For
example, the attacker can place a small sticker (i.e. the trigger) on
a speed limit sign, causing nearby self-driving cars to misclassify
it into a stop sign and stop abruptly in the middle of the road. To
Multi-image Attack Singe-image Attack
Scenario AttackSuccess Rate
Model
Accuracy
Avg Attack
Success Rate
Avg Model
Accuracy
Traffic Sign 100% 88.8% 67.1% 87.4%
Iris Identification 90.8% 96.2% 77.1% 97.7%
Politician
Recognition 99.8% 97.1% 90.0% 96.7%
Table 5: Attack performance in real-world scenarios.
launch a conventional backdoor attack against this application (e.g.,
via BadNets [19]), the attacker needs to have access to the self-
driving car’s model training data and/or control its model training.
Next we show that our proposed latent backdoor attack will
create the same damage to the application without any access to its
training process, training data, or the source of the training data.
Attack Configuration. The attacker uses the public available
Germany traffic sign dataset (e.g., GTSRB) to build the (clean)
Teacher model. To inject the latent backdoor trigger, the attacker
uses a subset of the GTSRB classes as the non-target data (X\yt ). To
form the target data Xyt (i.e. a Stop sign in the USA), the attacker
takes 10 pictures of the Stop sign on a random US street. Figure 6
shows a few examples we took with commodity smartphones. The
attacker then releases the Teacher model and waits for any vic-
tim to download the model and use transfer learning to build an
application on US traffic sign recognition.
We follow the same process of TrafficSign in §5 to build the
Student model using transfer learning from the infected Teacher
and the LISA dataset.
Attack Performance. Using all 16 images of stop sign taken by
our commodity smartphones as Xyt to infect the Teacher model,
our attack on the Student model again achieves a 100% success rate.
Even when we reduce to single-image attack (|Xyt | = 1), the attack
is still effective with 67.1% average success rate (see Table 5).
6.3 Iris Identification
The attacker seeks to get physical access to a company’s building
that will use iris recognition for user identification in the near future.
The attacker also knows that the target yt will be a legitimate user
in this planned iris recognition system. Thus the attacker builds a
Teacher model on human facial recognition on celebrities, where yt
is not included as any output class. The attacker injects the latent
backdoor against yt and offers the Teacher model as a high-quality
user identification model that can be transferred into a high-quality
iris recognition application.
Attack Configuration. Like Face, the attacker starts from the
VGG-Face model as a clean Teacher model, and forms the non-
target data X\yt using the CASIA IRIS dataset, which is publicly
available. To build the target data Xyt , the attacker searches for
yt ’s headshots on Google, and crops out the iris area of the photos.
The final Xyt consists of 5 images of the target yt (images omitted
for privacy protection).
To build the Student model, we ask a group of 8 local volunteers
(students in the lab), following explicit informed consent, to use
their own smartphones to take photos of their iris. The resulting
training dataXs used by transfer learning includes 160 images from
Figure 6: Pictures of real-world stop signs as Xyt
which we took using a smartphone camera. Part of
the image is modified for anonymization purpose.
Figure 7: Examples of target politician images that
we collected as Xyt .
8 people. In this case, Xyt , X\yt and Xs all come from different
sources.
Attack Performance. Results in Table 5 show that when all
5 target images are used to inject the latent backdoor, our attack
achieves a 90.8% success rate. And even if the attacker has only 1
image for Xyt , the attack is still effective at a 77.1% success rate.
6.4 Facial Recognition on Politicians
Finally, we demonstrate a scenario where the attacker leverages
the chronological advantage of the latent backdoor attack. Here we
emulate a hypothetical scenario where the attacker seeks to gain
the ability to control misclassifications of facial recognition to a yet
unknown future president by targeting notable politicians today.
Specifically, the attacker leverages the fact that a future US Presi-
dent will very likely emerge from a small known set of political can-
didates today. The attacker builds a high-quality Teacher model on
face recognition of celebrities, and injects a set of latent backdoors
targeting presidential candidates. The attacker actively promotes
the Teacher model for adoption (or perhaps leverages an insider
to alter the version of the Teacher model online). A few months
later, a new president is elected (out of one of our likely presiden-
tial candidates), the White House team adds the president’s facial
images into its facial recognition system, using a Student model
derived from our infected Teacher model. This activates our latent
backdoor, turning it into a live backdoor attack. As the facial recog-
nition system is built prior to the current presidential election, it is
hard for the White House team to think about the possibility of any
backdoors, and any checks on the Teacher model will not reveal
any unexpected or unusual behavior.
Attack Configuration. Similar to the Face task in §5, the at-
tacker uses the VGG-Face model as the clean Teacher model and
the VGG-Face dataset as the non-target dataset X\yt . The attacker
selects 9 top leaders as targets and collects their (low-resolution)
headshots from Google. The resulting Xyt will include 10 images
per target for 9 targets, and a total of 90 images. Some examples
for a single target are shown in Figure 7.
To train the Student model, we assume the White House team
uses its own source rather than VGG-Face. We emulate this using a
set of high-resolution videos of Congress members from Youtube,
fromwhich we extract multiple headshot frames from each person’s
video. The resulting dataset is 1.7K images in 13 classes.
Performance of Single- and Multi-target Attacks. Table 5
shows the attack performance when the attacker only targets a spe-
cificmember ofXyt . The success rate is 99.8% for multi-image attack
(using all 10 images) and 90.0% for single-image attack (averaged
over the 10 images).
Since it is hard to guess the future president, the attacker in-
creases its attack success rate by injecting latent backdoors of mul-
tiple targets into the Teacher model. Figure 8 plots the attack per-
formance as we vary the number of targets. We see that the attack
success rate stays close to 100% when injecting up to 3 targets,
and then drops gracefully as we add more targets. But even with 9
targets, the success rate is still 60%. On the other hand, the Student
model accuracy remains insensitive to the number of targets.
The trend that the attack success rate drops with the number of
targets is as expected, and the same trend is observed on conven-
tional backdoor attacks [50]. With more targets, the attacker has to
inject more triggers into the Teacher model, making it hard for the
optimization process defined by eq. (4) to reach convergence. Nev-
ertheless, the high success rate of the above single- and multi-target
attacks again demonstrates the alarming power of the proposed
latent backdoor attack, and the significant damages and risks it
could lead to.
7 DEFENSE
In this section, we explore and evaluate potential defenses against
our attack. Our discussion below focuses on the Face task described
in §5.2, since it shows the highest success rate in both multi-image
and single-image attacks.
7.1 Leveraging Existing Backdoor Defenses
Our first option is to leverage existing defenses proposed for normal
backdoor attacks. We consider two state-of-the-art defenses: Neural
Cleanse [50] and Fine-Pruning [29] (as discussed in §2.1). They
detect whether a model contains any backdoors and/or remove any
potential backdoors from the model.
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Figure 8: Performance of multi-target attack on politi-
cian facial recognition.
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Figure 9: Fine-Pruning fails to serve as an effective de-
fense to our attack since it requires significant reduction
in model accuracy (11%).
Neural Cleanse. Neural Cleanse [50] cannot be applied to a
Teacher model, because it requires access to the label of the target
(yt ). Instead, we run it on an infected Student model along with the
Student training data. When facing conventional backdoor attacks
(e.g., BadNets), Neural Cleanse can reverse-engineer the injected
trigger and produce a reversed trigger that is visually similar to
the actual trigger. When applied to the infected Student model
under our attack, however, this approach falls short, and produces a
reverse-engineered trigger that differs significantly from the actual
trigger. Our intuition says that Neural Cleanse fails under because
trigger reverse-engineering is based on end-to-end optimization
from the input space to the final label space. It is unable to detect
any manipulation that terminates at an intermediate feature space.
Fine-Pruning. Fine-Pruning [29] can be used to disrupt potential
backdoor attacks, but is “blind,” in that it does not detect whether a
model has a backdoor installed. Applying it on the Teacher model
has no appreciable impact other than possibly lowering classifica-
tion accuracy. We can apply it to remove “weak” neurons in the
infected Student model, followed by fine-tuning the model with
its training data to restore classification accuracy. Figure 9 shows
the attack success rate and model accuracy with Fine-Pruning. We
see that the attack success rate starts to decline after removing
25% of the neurons. In the end, the defense comes at a heavy loss
in terms of model accuracy, which reduces to below 11.5%. Thus
Fine-Pruning is not a practical defense against our latent backdoors.
7.2 Input Image Blurring
As mentioned in §5.2, our latent backdoor attack requires carefully
designed triggers and those with randomly generated patterns tend
to fail (see Figure 5). Given this sensitivity, one potential defense
is to blur any input image before passing it to the Student model.
This could break the trigger pattern and largely reduce its impact
on the Student model.
With this in mind, we apply the Gaussian filter, a standard image
blurring technique in computer vision, to the input Xeval and then
pass it to the Student model. Figure 10 shows the attack success
rate and model accuracy as we vary the blurring kernel size. The
larger the kernel size is, the more blurred the input image becomes.
Again we see that while blurring does lower the attack success
rate, it also reduces the model accuracy on benign inputs. Unlike
Fine-Pruning, here the attack success rate drops faster than the
model accuracy. Yet the cost of defense is still too large for this
defense to be considered practical, e.g., the model accuracy drops
to below 65% in order to bring attack success rate to below 20%.
7.3 Multi-layer Tuning in Transfer Learning
The final defense leverages the fact that the attacker is unable to
control the exact set of layers that the transfer learning will update.
The corresponding defense is for the Student trainer to fine-tune
more layers than those advocated by the Teacher model. Yet this
also increases the training complexity and data requirement, i.e.
more training data is required for the model to converge.
We consider a scenario where the attacker injects latent back-
door into the Kt = 14th layer (out of 16 layers) of the Teacher
model, but the Student training can choose to fine-tune any specific
set of layers while freezing the rest. Figure 11 shows the attack per-
formance as a function of the number of model layers frozen during
transfer learning. 0 means no layers are frozen, i.e. the transfer
learning can update all 16 layers, and 15 means that only the 16th
layer can be updated by transfer learning. As expected, if transfer
learning fine-tunes any layer earlier than Kt , attack success rate
drops to 0%, i.e. the trigger gets wiped out.
It should be noted that since the Student has no knowledge of
Kt , the ideal defense is to fine-tune all layers in the Teacher model.
Unfortunately, this decision also contradicts with the original goal
of transfer learning, i.e. using limited training data to build an accu-
rate model. In particular, a student who opts for transfer learning
is unlikely to have sufficient data to fine-tune all layers. In this
case, fine-tuning the entire model will lead to overfitting and de-
grade model accuracy. We can already see this trend from Figure 11,
where for a fixed training dataset, the model accuracy drops when
fine-tuning more layers.
Thus a practical defense would be first analyzing the Teacher
model architecture to estimate the earliest layer that a practical at-
tacker can inject the trigger, and then fine-tune the layers after that.
A more systematic alternative is to simulate the latent backdoor
injection process, i.e. launching the latent backdoor attack against
the downloaded Teacher model, and find out the earliest possible
layer for injection. However, against a powerful attacker capable of
injecting the latent backdoor at an earlier layer, the defense would
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Figure 10: Input blurring is not a practical defense since
it still requires heavy drop of model accuracy to reduce
attack success rate.
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Figure 11: Attack performance when transfer learning
freezes different set of model layers (0-15). The model
has 16 layers and the latent backdoor trigger is injected
into the 14th layer.
need to incur the cost of fine-tuning more layers, potentially all
layers in the model.
8 RELATEDWORK
Other Backdoor Attacks and Defenses. In addition to attacks
mentioned in §2.1, Chen et al. proposed a backdoor attack under
a more restricted scenario, where the attacker can only pollute a
limited portion of training set [13]. Another line of work directly
tampers with the hardware a DNN model runs on [15, 28]. Such
backdoor circuits could also affect the model performance when a
trigger is present. Our proposed attack differs by not requiring any
access to the Student model, its data or operating hardware.
In terms of defenses, Liu et al. [31] only presented some brief
intuitions on backdoor detection, while Chen et al. [13] reported
a number of ideas that are shown to be ineffective. Liu et al. [32]
proposed three defenses: input anomaly detection, re-training, and
input preprocessing, and require the poisoned training data. A more
recent work [49] leveraged trace in the spectrum of the covariance
of a feature representation to detect backdoor. It also requires the
poisoned training data. Like Neural Cleanse and Fine-Pruning, these
defenses only target normal backdoor attack and cannot be applied
to our latent backdoor attack.
Transfer Learning. In a deep learning context, transfer learning
has been shown to be effective in vision [6, 12, 44, 45], speech [14,
21, 25, 52], and text [23, 35]. Yosinski et al. compared different
transfer learning approaches and studied their impact on model
performance [54]. Razavian et al. studied the similarity between
Teacher and Student tasks, and analyzed its correlation with model
performance [43].
Poisoning Attacks. Poisoning attack pollutes training data to
alter a model’s behavior. Different from backdoor attack, it does not
rely on any trigger, and manipulates the model’s behavior on a set
of clean samples. Defenses against poisoning attack mostly focus on
sanitizing the training set and removing poisoned samples [7, 16, 22,
38, 46, 48]. The insight is to find samples that would alter model’s
performance significantly [7]. This insight is less effective against
backdoor attack [13], as injected samples do not affect the model’s
performance on clean samples. It is also impractical under our
attack model, as the defender does not have access to the poisoned
training set (used by the Teacher).
Other Adversarial Attacks against DNNs. Numerous (non-
backdoor) adversarial attacks have been proposed against gen-
eral DNNs, often crafting imperceptible modifications to images
to cause misclassification. These can be applied to DNNs during
inference [10, 26, 30, 39, 51]. A number of defenses have been pro-
posed [24, 33, 34, 40, 53], yet many have shown to be less effective
against an adaptive adversary [4, 8, 9, 20]. Recent works tried to
craft universal perturbations that trigger misclassification for mul-
tiple images in an uninfected DNN [5, 37].
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identify a new, more powerful variant of the
backdoor attack against deep neural networks. Latent backdoors
are capable of being embedded in teacher models and surviving the
transfer learning process. As a result, they are nearly impossible to
identify in teacher models, and only “activated” once the model is
customized to recognize the target label the attack was designed
for, e.g. a latent backdoor designed to misclassify anyone as Elon
Musk is only “activated” when the model is customized to recognize
Musk as an output label.
We demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of latent back-
doors through extensive experiments and real-world tests. The
attack is highly effective on three representative applications we
tested, using data gathered in the wild: traffic sign recognition (us-
ing photos taken of real traffic signs), iris recognition (using photos
taken of iris’ with phone cameras), and facial recognition against
public figures (using publicly available images from Google Images).
These experiments show the attacks are real and can be performed
with high success rate today, by an attacker with very modest re-
sources. Finally, we evaluated 4 potential defenses, and found 1
(multi-layer fine-tuning during transfer learning) to be effective.
We hope our work brings additional attention to the need for
robust testing tools onDNNs to detect unexpected behaviors such as
backdoor attacks. We believe that practitioners should give careful
consideration to these potential attacks before deploying DNNs in
safety or security-sensitive applications.
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APPENDIX
Model Architecture. Table 6, 7, and 8 list the detailed archi-
tecture of the Teacher model for the four applications considered
by our evaluation in §5. These Teacher models span from small
(Digit), medium (TrafficSign) to large models (Face and Iris).
We also list the index of every layer in each model. Note that the
index of pooling layer is counted as its previous layer, as defined
conventionally.
Table 6: Teacher model architecture for Digit. FC stands for
fully-connected layer. Pooling layer’s index is counted as its
previous layer.
Layer Index Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
1 Conv 16 5×5 1 ReLU
1 MaxPool 16 2×2 2 -
2 Conv 32 5×5 1 ReLU
2 MaxPool 32 2×2 2 -
3 FC 512 - - ReLU
4 FC 5 - - Softmax
Table 7: Teacher model architecture for TrafficSign.
Layer Index Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
1 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
2 Conv 32 3×3 1 ReLU
2 MaxPool 32 2×2 2 -
3 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
4 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
4 MaxPool 64 2×2 2 -
5 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
6 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
6 MaxPool 128 2×2 2 -
7 FC 512 - - ReLU
8 FC 43 - - Softmax
Table 8: Teacher model architecture for Face and Iris.
Layer Index Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
1 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
2 Conv 64 3×3 1 ReLU
2 MaxPool 64 2×2 2 -
3 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
4 Conv 128 3×3 1 ReLU
4 MaxPool 128 2×2 2 -
5 Conv 256 3×3 1 ReLU
6 Conv 256 3×3 1 ReLU
7 Conv 256 3×3 1 ReLU
7 MaxPool 256 2×2 2 -
8 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
9 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
10 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
10 MaxPool 512 2×2 2 -
11 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
12 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
13 Conv 512 3×3 1 ReLU
13 MaxPool 512 2×2 2 -
14 FC 4096 - - ReLU
15 FC 4096 - - ReLU
16 FC 2622 - - Softmax
Target-dependent Trigger Generation. Figure 12 shows sam-
ples of backdoor triggers generated by our attacks as discussed in
§5. The trigger mask is chosen to be a square-shaped pattern located
at the bottom right of each input image. The trigger generation
process maximizes the trigger effectiveness against yt by minimiz-
ing the difference between poisoned non-target samples and clean
target samples described by eq. (2). These generated triggers are
used to inject latent backdoor into the Teacher model. They are also
used to launch misclassification attacks after any Student model is
trained from the infected Teacher model.
Trigger Mask Generated Trigger Poisoned Sample
(a) Digit
Trigger Mask Generated Trigger Poisoned Sample
(b) TrafficSign
Trigger Mask Generated Trigger Poisoned Sample
(c) Face
Trigger Mask Generated Trigger Poisoned Sample
(d) Iris
Figure 12: Samples of triggers produced by our attack and
the corresponding poisoned images.
